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From backdoors and back lanes to backchannels: Reappraising British talks 






Following the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, the British 
Government established an office dedicated to gathering the views of political 
groups there, below the level of the state. By the end of 1971, the Office of the 
UK Representative (UKREP) was actively seeking contacts that would allow 
them to communicate with the Provisional IRA. By looking at the numerous 
other contacts, conduits and intermediaries that existed (however temporarily) 
before the 1975 ceasefire, this article illustrates an almost continuous 
conversation between the Office of the UK Representative (UKREP) and the IRA. 
It also demonstrates that these contacts were centred around Dáithí Ó Conaill 
(then Sinn Fein Vice President), and that these contacts, when taken as a 
whole, can better explain the events which culminated in the 1975 ceasefire.  
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Introduction 
‘The Talks at Feakle came out of the blue for us in the British government. Ever 
since 1969 when the army took over security in Northern Ireland, there had 
been ad hoc street contacts between the army and paramilitaries on both sides 
of the divide, and from the time I had taken office in March 1974 I was being 
advised that, according to community workers, businessmen and journalists, 
the Provisional IRA were in a mood to move from violence. Nevertheless, I was 
always sceptical and remained so when in November I was told of some sort of 
approach being made by the Provisional IRA.’1  




The above extract from Secretary of State Merlyn Rees’s memoir of his time in Northern 
Ireland is both strangely evasive and contradictory. Rees does not explain how, if he knew 
that ‘community workers, businessmen and journalists’ spoke to the IRA, why a group of 
protestant clergymen doing apparently the same thing should be so surprising. And while 
his 1985 book was not consciously misleading, his interpretation of events was very 
different from the views he noted at the time both in his tape-recorded diary2, as well as in 
sensitive passages held back from publication from this same memoir.3 Talks with 
paramilitaries (in particular the Provisional IRA) were in fact rarely as ad hoc as Rees 
suggested and had been taking place on an increasingly regular basis since July 1974. Such 
talks, it will be demonstrated, existed in their own context by the end of 1974 and sources 
clearly demonstrate that these contacts, in fact, were well into their third wave since the 
beginning of 1972.  
Far from ‘out of the blue’ therefore, talks with the Provisional IRA were a fact of 
political life for some British officials in Northern Ireland whether or not they succeeded in 
bringing about a ceasefire (which they did in 1972 and in 1975).   
The context for this lies in the origins of Britain’s response to the Northern Ireland’s civil 
rights crisis, specifically in that part of Britain’s response that sought to take account of 
Nationalist views and transmit them without Unionist interference directly to the British 
government. The emergence of the Provisional IRA, and its determination to fight a war 
against the British Army in the summer of 1970 created new pressures on Britain’s 
response. It politicised the British military presence to a far greater degree than was 
intended by the introduction of the troops in August 1969 and, with the deaths of the first 
British soldiers in 1971, policy moved from operations designed to give ‘aid to the civil 
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power’ to the form of imperial counter insurgency the British Army had been fighting 
previously in Aden, Kenya and Malaya. Still, there remained a key cohort surrounding the UK 
Representative and later the Secretary of State who were dedicated to identifying and 
resolving the political grievances at the heart of the crisis that became the Northern Ireland 
Troubles.   
 For the IRA too there was pressure. The Catholic community it claimed to represent 
were not supportive of an unlimited guerrilla campaign and there was almost immediate 
disenchantment when either the Official or Provisional IRA overstepped the mark. While 
PIRA Chief of Staff Sean MacStíofáin may have emphasised the need to ‘escalate, escalate, 
escalate’4, the wider ‘Republican Movement’ always maintained a political strategy however 
underdeveloped it might have been..  
 The political side of the Provisionals’ early strategy was contained in Éire Nua, Sinn 
Fein’s manifesto written by Dáithí Ó Conaill5 and Ruairí Ó Brádaigh6 in January 1971. Éire 
Nua demonstrated a side to the Provisionals that was not apparent in the headlines 
produced by the group’s violence. The Ireland it foresaw was socialist, autarkic and 
decentralised whereProvincial parliaments would ensure the rights of minorities, and thus 
the protection of the Protestant population of Northern Ireland.7 
  
While Éire Nua gave no concession to the right of unionists to opt out of a united Ireland – 
despite their status as a majority within the proposed Ulster parliament (Dáil Uladh), the 
essence of Éire Nua was still practical and political. It did not, for instance, envisage the 
need for nihilistic aggression or civil war between ‘Orange and Green’ in order to establish 
Irish unity, in this the Provisional IRA always saw their battle – however naïvely – as being 
with British forces in Ireland alone.   
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Squaring the Provisionals’ political aims, with its violent (and often sectarian) actions 
in the early 1970s is not simple. Éire Nua was not just a propaganda device designed to allay 
the moral consciences of Irish republicans in the 1970s, nor was it simply a sop designed to 
garner support from Irish America. Éire Nua – when taken seriously – also represents the 
genuine early political aspirations of Provisional Sinn Fein, aspirations that remained 
separate from the practicalities of the armed campaign. By publishing such a document, the 
Provisionals were demonstrating that they remained an organisation that would continue to 
maintain the means through which their goals could be negotiated.  
  
The new Standard Narrative 
Whilst it can be readily demonstrated that, even at the height of the violence, both the IRA 
and the British government contained elements that were willing to talk, a new standard 
narrative of the peace process has recently emerged that centres on the use of just one key 
intermediary – the Derry businessman Brendan Duddy. An example of this recent 
historiographical change lies in accounts of the origins of the 1974/75 ceasefire.  Whereas 
previous accounts tended to revolve around the role of the Protestant clergymen led by 
Rev. Arlow and their meetings with the IRA’s leadership in December 1974 and early January 
1975,8 we now know that Duddy (‘The Derry Link’) delivered a key message from the British 
to Sinn Fein President Ruairí Ó Brádaigh that Christmas morning and that Duddy was then 
brought to speak at a PIRA Army Council meeting on New Year’s Eve.9  This new and 
compelling evidence of Duddy’s role in 1974/5, in 1980/1 and from 1990 to 1993 is in the 
process of being released10 and certainly confirms Peter Taylor’s research which first 
uncovered the then anonymous ‘Derry Link’ in 1998.11 However, while illuminating, precious 
little archive evidence exists to add substance to this argument and over-reliance on the 
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Duddy narrative itself is not without methodological risk. Jonathan Powell’s memoir for 
example has now even suggested that the Feakle talks were a ‘cover story’12 and Richard 
English’s newest work has abandoned an account of Feakle and also uses Powell’s singular 
‘backchannel’13 thesis. This trend toward an account of the role of Brendan Duddy alone is 
reductionist, and replacing one narrative for another is not good enough without first 
examining fully material that is already available.  
While less serious, there are also problems too with accounts that consider of the 
negotiations toward the 1974/5 ceasefire in chronological isolation. Ed Moloney’s 
suggestion that the talk of a ceasefire began with the Feakle talks in December before 
continuing with Duddy in Derry in January14 is inaccurate. And while John Bew and Martyn 
Frampton give the best overall account yet available, their version favours a change in the 
fortunes of the Provisional IRA by the winter of 1974 for bringing them unwillingly to the 
negotiating table.15 Bew and Frampton, while they give ample consideration to the idea that 
it was virtually always in the IRA’s interests to talk, they discount the continuity of the 
personal links forged in all the previous sets of talks that made for an almost continuous 
discourse between some British officials and a section of the PIRA over a three year period 
between January 1972 and December 1974. It should be remembered also that both Harold 
Wilson and Merlyn Rees had personally met many of the Provisional IRA’s leadership and 
Rees – though his role as the later ‘Derry Link’ remained hidden from him – had even eaten 
lunch at Westminster with Brendan Duddy whilst opposition spokesman on Northern 
Ireland in 1972.16 Thus, in taking account only of Brendan Duddy and the Feakle talks, and 
reducing their analyses to the weeks surrounding the 1975 ceasefire alone, the current 
explanations require a broader view.  This article offers a more rigorous analysis of the 
earliest secret talks and communications with the Provisional IRA in the years leading up to 
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the 1975 ceasefire. Its purpose is to demonstrate that while the available literature has 
rightly become enamoured with Brendan Duddy, his story remains an example of something 
much wider in scope and with broader implications for both the history of Britain’s political 
connection with Northern Ireland as well as with the history of the Provisional IRA.  
 
Talks and the Office of the UKREP 
In August 1969, British officials were sent alongside troops to monitor the political situation 
in Northern Ireland. The Wilson government were deeply suspicious of the motives and 
future direction of James Chichester Clark’s Stormont administration and thus established 
the Office of the UKREP to keep an eye on the political developments there and the progress 
of Stormont’s reform programme. Led by three successive UKREPs before Direct Rule (Oliver 
Wright, Ronnie Burroughs and Howard Smith) the post was designed to be similar to that of 
an ambassador to Northern Ireland. Above and beyond the Northern Ireland Governor, the 
UKREP was both an active gatherer of information as well as a distributor of British 
government opinion. In this, the UKREP established offices far from Stormont at the Conway 
Hotel in south-west Belfast so that meetings could be held, visitors entertained, and 
opinions discreetly gathered.  
 The UKREP himself – a Foreign Office official usually of ambassadorial rank – was 
therefore assigned specifically for the purpose of political intelligence gathering and right off 
the mark began meeting and greeting the great and the good of Northern Ireland political 
life whether Unionist, Nationalist, Protestant or Catholic. Oliver Wright, the first UKREP (and 
previously a trusted aid of Harold Wilson’s) also began the curious practice of writing a 
regular despatch to the Home Secretary on events in Northern Ireland, using the standard 
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Foreign Office formatting to report on a place that was ostensibly part of the United 
Kingdom. 
Although Wright would later disregard his temporary role in Northern Ireland as 
unimportant, (he commented that, ‘I did a bit of John the Baptist for Jim Callaghan’17) this 
was far from the case. By establishing a base so far from the seat of government; by 
engaging with all manner of local politician and community leader; and by sending those 
reports directly onto Whitehall’s newly established ‘Irish Net’18, Oliver Wright, created a 
‘backdoor’ channel of information on Northern Ireland that was uniquely detached from 
sources supplied by or through the Northern Ireland government. The UKREP specifically 
chose the Conway Hotel in South West Belfast so that discreet talks could be held away 
from the gaze of the Northern Ireland government across the city at Stormont.  
 Of course, for the duration of this office’s existence the presence of troops on 
Northern Ireland’s streets was considered a temporary measure only. In this respect, so too 
was the office of the UKREP. Papers therefore from this, the predecessor to the Northern 
Ireland Office (NIO), are rare and widely distributed in the archives with only four dedicated 
files in the National Archives to record the 22 months that the UKREP was based at the 
Conway hotel from August 1969 to July 1971, (indeed, they did not even order stationery, 
and improvised by borrowing Stormont Castle’s or sometimes using the Hotel’s own). 
Nevertheless, Wright’s despatches exist in significant numbers elsewhere to demonstrate 
his and his successors’ role as envoys on behalf of Harold Wilson and later Ted Heath.19  
 While the backdoor of the Conway Hotel was always open, the meetings held there, 
though private, were not of themselves particularly ‘secret’ events. Neither Oliver Wright 
nor Ronnie Burroughs went out of their way to gather the opinions of paramilitaries at this 
stage and with the increased violence that included the IRA’s bombing of hotels and other 
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businesses, the office was moved to a more secure location, closer to Stormont, in the 
summer of 1971.  
Burroughs chose a large house for his purposes on the shores of Belfast Lough. The 
house, known as Laneside, while now suspected of being the home of British Intelligence,20  
was to be the residence and offices of the expanding British political reporting service.  
Fortunately for historians – though perhaps ironically considering its reputation – far more 
archive material exists regarding the work of Laneside before and after Direct Rule, 
compared with that which avoided the shredder at the relatively insecure Conway Hotel. 
What is clear from this material is that Laneside was not a British intelligence station in any 
classic ‘cloak and dagger’ sense of the term. Nor was the UKREP there to plot the downfall 
of Northern Ireland Prime Minister Brian Faulkner.21 It was, primarily, a more professional 
base where people could meet and speak with British officials and from where professional 
staff could monitor the Northern Ireland political scene.  
 While talks continued at Laneside with various community representatives, the 
UKREP’s Deputy, Frank Steele, who arrived in October 1971, was given the shadier task of 
finally leaving the office and extending Laneside’s contacts deeper into Northern Ireland’s 
troubled communities. Steele, a career MI6 officer, expanded the links that had been made 
at the Conway Hotel by beginning communications with the lower ranks of clergy and 
politicians, rather than waiting for them to appear at the backdoor of the Conway Hotel, or 
on Laneside’s front porch. Steele was interested in speaking to local community leaders too, 
which, in the context of Northern Ireland in 1971, meant speaking for the first time to those 
much closer to the operational elements of say, the Official and Provisional IRAs.  
 Thus the first backchannel contacts occurred separately from the official UKREP and 
outside of Laneside itself. These were largely inadvertent, made in the course of any job like 
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Steele’s that required the investigation of community tensions on the ground. Certainly, 
following the introduction of internment without trial in August 1971, the British were 
beginning to understand the problems they faced much better, but they were not 
proactively seeking contact with paramilitaries at that point. Still, political intelligence had 
been divided from operational, and the precedent had been set. Michael Smith has more 
recently described MI6’s role in this kind of ‘Parallel Diplomacy’ and cites various examples 
of its use beyond Northern Ireland, (Mozambique, Angola, and Yugoslavia). Smith believes 
this aspect of MI6’s work to be ‘one of the least discussed uses of Intelligence Services’ that 
is, ‘[the establishment] of channels of communication with the enemy that would be too 
dangerous, both physically and politically for ministers or ordinary civil servants to 
contemplate.’22 Frank Steele’s job as the Deputy UKREP (as with the UKREP) was thus to 
disregard this physical and political risk in an attempt to understand the conflict better and 
to pass whatever insights he could make back to London.  
Early Contacts: 1972 
From British records it was the IRA who approached them to seek contact and negotiation 
although the tasking of people like Frank Steele suggests the British were already preparing 
for this prospect. The first documented instance of this came in January 1972 via 
Conservative MP Michael Heseltine and the Home Office.23 Heseltine had been contacted by 
Dr John O’Connell, an Irish Labour Party TD and long-time acquaintance of Heseltine’s. 
O’Connell had spoken in vague terms regarding a message he had for the Home Secretary 
and the message was duly passed on. The Home Office sought clarification through the 
Foreign Office but the Dublin Embassy could only reassure them of O’Connell’s widely held 
reputation as a ‘do-gooder’.24 Despite the problems, O’Connell was eventually granted a 
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meeting in London and only then revealed his offer; direct talks between the British 
government and two senior members of the Provisional IRA. Though was quickly turned 
down25 O’Connell persevered and the Home Office was forced to ignore his determined 
pleas for a further six weeks26 as neither they nor the FCO would risk the political fall-out of 
such a meeting without an IRA ceasefire.  
In the wake of Bloody Sunday, which was followed shortly by the burning of the British 
Embassy in Dublin, and a series of reprisal attacks by both the Official and Provisional IRA. 
Direct talks one might have thought were an impossibility. But O’Connell was far from the 
only channel the Provisionals were using in an attempt to talk to the British. MI5 and 
Military Intelligence came even closer to direct dialogue with the Provisional IRA leadership 
within just a week of O’Connell’s initial efforts in Dublin. The meeting in this instance took 
place at Victoria RUC Barracks in Derry city on 9 February 1972. In attendance was Frank 
Morris – adjutant of the Provisionals in Counties Derry, Donegal and Tyrone.27 There, Morris 
delivered a message from Sean MacStíofáin, then PIRA Chief of Staff, intended to begin 
discussions with the British. MacStíofáin’s note, it was recorded, pursued the following logic;  
‘The British Army could not defeat the IRA, the IRA could not defeat the British 
Army. In the event of a Protestant Backlash the Roman Catholics could not 
defeat the UVF. Therefore [MacStíofáin] proposed a truce between the British 
Army and the IRA.’28 
 
Such bravado on behalf of the Provisional leadership was not without substance due to a 
surge in support in the weeks following Bloody Sunday. But to both the British army and the 
MI5 officer present such a judgement was misplaced. In fact, these groups had been telling 
each other for several months that, far from nearing victory, the IRA was worn-out by 
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Internment and crippled by their new intelligence networks.29 British Intelligence in 
Northern Ireland however was still incorrectly identifying Dáithí Ó Conaill as PIRA Chief of 
Staff when in fact it had been the more elusive (and more militant) Sean MacStíofáin.30 
Frank Morris was dropped as a contact primarily because those he spoke to felt they had 
the Provisional IRA near collapse.31  
 John O’Connell re-entered the frame only a month later when he convinced Harold 
Wilson ( with Edward Heath’s knowledge32)  to travel to Dublin as leader of the opposition 
and meet with a senior IRA delegation that included Dáithí Ó Conaill (as well as leading 
Belfast Provisionals Joe Cahill and John Kelly). Wilson, who was accompanied by the future 
Northern Ireland Secretary Merlyn Rees, sounded out the Provisional IRA leaders regarding 
the counter-productive nature of their methods, and the potential for them to trust in 
Northern Ireland’s existing nationalist politicians.33 Wilson patronised the delegates when 
he asked them to identify politicians they could trust as surrogates for their message; the 
delegates of course considered themselves to be the political leaders Britain needed to 
engage with, and did not understand the need for political middlemen who might negotiate 
on their behalf.  Although Wilson noted how impressed he had been by Dáithí Ó Conaill,34 
the seventy-two hour ceasefire ended within an hour of his departure.35  
 These three initiatives took place in the first months of 1972, the bloodiest year of 
the Northern Ireland Troubles, two in the aftermath of Bloody Sunday when hope for peace 
might have seemed at its lowest ebb. 1972 saw a total of 479 deaths, including 126 British 
troops and UDR killed by the IRA.36 Arguably all efforts at building even secret bridges could 
not be rushed at this stage as the violence could not simply be ignored. But still, the IRA 
having declared 1972 as their ‘year of victory’ had a relatively short-term view for their 
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military campaign and had at least seemed willing to talk. Indeed, by mid-summer, 
preparations were being made for the Provisionals’ first publicly declared ceasefire.     
Frank Steele, while he continued his work in Derry and elsewhere, was first 
introduced to Brendan Duddy at some point between Wilson’s meeting with O Conaill in 
Dublin and the cessation of June 1972. Duddy however played little part in the discussions 
that led up to this ceasefire, where Northern Ireland’s first Secretary of State William 
Whitelaw used John Hume as his preferred backchannel.37 Steele was chosen (accompanied 
by the NIO’s Deputy Secretary Philip Woodfield) to meet with an IRA delegation Hume had 
arranged, and they were given a personal letter of introduction from Whitelaw. The IRA 
delegation included Dáithí Ó Conaill and Gerry Adams. The Irish government had been 
informed of the talks and had agreed to Hume’s request that Ó Conaill be granted free 
passage to attend. Adams, also, had been specially released from internment by the 
Secretary of State so he could attend the meeting.38 
The meeting between Steele and the IRA leadership went remarkably well, it avoided 
recriminations and was relatively friendly.39  Steele and Woodfield’s remarkable 
achievement lay in not judging, berating or second guessing the initiative. This paid 
dividends with Ó Conaill using his influence to gain an IRA ceasefire on 26 June in exchange 
for a meeting in London on 7 July. This meeting with Whitelaw however, at Cheyne Walk in 
Chelsea, was a disaster. Ó Conaill presented a copy of Éire Nua to the Secretary of State40 
before the rest of the IRA team gave the British little more than an eighteen month quit 
notice; something the British were not at all prepared for, or likely to succumb to.41  
 Despite the acrimonious meeting and lack of negotiating skill by the IRA delegation, 
Steele continued his conversations with the men on the flight back to Northern Ireland.42 
Steele it seemed, had developed a functioning relationship with a senior member of the 
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delegation and, although the ceasefire was now rapidly crumbling, in the days after Cheyne 
Walk, the MI6 officer continued to receive telephone messages from Dáithí Ó Conaill (under 
the alias of Sebastian Coffey) on the hotline he had established at Laneside.43  
Steele did not step in to resolve the crisis that eventually broke the 1972 ceasefire – 
the Lenadoon affair – nor could he have stopped the shooting of a further five Catholic 
civilians (including a 13 year old girl and a priest) by British soldiers a few miles away in 
Ballymurphy.44 The hotline between negotiators was ill-equipped to deal with the minutiae 
of contentious incidents on the ground when the same channels were being used to discuss 
the broader political problem itself. If the Lenadoon affair was avoidable, and the 
Ballymurphy shootings criminal; future ceasefires would need a systematic incident 
reporting and aversion system. The way in which the 1972 ceasefire had broken down thus 
led directly to establishment of incident centres, staffed by local civil servants stationed in 
Social Services offices throughout the 1975 cessation and demonstrates a key continuity 
between the ceasefires of 1972 and 1975.      
 Beyond events in Cheyne Walk, Lenadoon and Ballymurphy, the IRA chose to 
investigate two other perceived backchannels to the British in the summer of 1972. Joe 
Cahill had met the acquaintance of Dame Ruth Railton (founder of the National Youth 
Orchestra and wife of newspaper magnate Cecil King). Railton (considered something of a 
condescending socialite on dining terms with Ted Heath) met and entertained Cahill and Ó 
Conaill at her Donnybrook home in Dublin on several occasions that summer.45 There, she 
advertised (falsely) her influence over the British Prime Minister, and later boasted to other 
friends that ‘she had spent two whole nights with the IRA –“My Provisionals” – drawing up a 
plan to solve the whole mess.’46 
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 After the ceasefire broke down, the IRA met again with Harold Wilson in a meeting 
to which Whitelaw was made aware of and had ‘demurred’.47 This time the meeting was in 
England, at Great Missenden, Bucks where Wilson kept a house close to Chequers. The IRA 
delegation led by Joe Cahill was flown by private plane from Dublin on 18 July, 48 but again, 
this meeting came to no agreement.49 Merlyn Rees noted later that the Provisionals 
‘basically repeated the demands already made to Whitelaw. Harold emphasised that a 
leader of the opposition could give no commitment, and he castigated them for putting the 
Secretary of State in an impossible position by having revealed their talks with him.’50 
Although otherwise a complete failure, this second meeting with Wilson marks the only 
occasion in which Dáithí Ó Conaill was not personally involved at the highest level. In fact, Ó 
Conaill may have been specifically excluded from attending this meeting by the IRA Army 
Council.51 The surprising exception here proves the point that he had become the essential 
evangeliser of Éire Nua and the Provisionals’ political strategy.   
 Less than a fortnight later, in response to Bloody Friday’s car bomb attacks 
throughout central Belfast, and incensed by the IRA’s return to violence, the British 
launched a new strategy aimed at forcing the IRA out of its urban enclaves and away from 
its supporters.52 This was defined by Operation Motorman on the morning of 31 July 1972 
when the British Army saturated the ‘No Go’ areas of Belfast and Derry, so ending their 
existence as IRA safe havens. Frank Steele, had allowed the IRA to be forewarned of the 
operation so minimising the risk to life and property such an operation would incur if 
opposed,53 but also removing barricades in a way that would grant him greater liberty to 
meet his contacts in these crucial Catholic areas.  
 
Dr Tony Craig March 2011 t.craig@staffs.ac.uk  
15 
 
Contacts after the 1972 ceasefire 
While Steele and later Michael Oatley (soon to be his successor in the most secret 
aspects of his work) were most interested in contacts that could put them in touch with the 
upper echelons of the IRA, there were numerous other groups that volunteered their 
services as intermediaries, especially in 1973 in the context of the inter-party talks that were 
leading up to the Sunningdale agreement. One such group, Conciliation Ireland54 
approached Laneside after having spoken to both the Irish government and the Catholic 
Church. Conciliation Ireland espoused the view that, following Sean MacStíofáin’s arrest and 
imprisonment in the Republic in December 1972, ‘[The IRA] clearly wanted a ceasefire’ but 
would not commit to one unless they had a guarantees regarding their safety from arrest.55 
Steele’s reaction was well considered, partly because he did not trust the IRA and partly 
because it was now plainly stated government policy not to talk to the IRA. He told the 
group that there could be no deal without a ceasefire first, but then added that the British 
would ‘lower the level of our activity’ if the ceasefire were permanent – i.e. more than a 
fortnight in duration – and that until that point ‘the IRA must remain in hiding as otherwise 
they would be liable to be lifted by us.’56 In other words, if the IRA were to declare a 
ceasefire and remain in hiding, they would be allowed to re-emerge in a relatively short 
space of time without fear of arrest. Steele was de facto communicating with the IRA via 
Conciliation Ireland, making them aware that their concession would be granted without 
explicitly communicating with them.  
 Again in May 1973 two Northern Ireland Labour Party politicians57 gave the 
Secretary of State a direct account of their meeting with senior Provisional IRA members. 
Once more Dáithí Ó Conaill emerged from the discussions as the most conciliatory and 
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offered a structured and monitored truce in exchange for talks that would lead to a 
timetabled British withdrawal from Northern Ireland.58  
Yet another source emerged briefly in September 1973 in the unusual form of 
retired Vice Chief of the General Staff, General Sir John Hackett.  Hackett had kept a holiday 
home in West Donegal and there, on the streets of the village of Killybegs, he had met none 
other than Dáithí Ó Conaill. Ó Conaill again confirmed to Hackett that he was interested in 
discussions with the British and, over a number of telephone calls, he explained to Hackett 
that he was serious about dialogue. Hackett’s exchange culminated in a request to the 
Secretary of State not to arrest Ó Conaill as ‘his removal would open opportunities for less 
respectable elements [of the Provisional IRA]’59 before handing over ‘a rather thick wad’ of 
documents relating to Ó Conaill’s political ideas.60  
While Hackett was correct to be concerned about Ó Conaill (he had now become the 
Republic’s most-wanted man)61 Whitelaw refused to entertain the potentially embarrassing 
contact with Ó Conaill via the General, as he was already in very sensitive discussions with 
the main political parties in the run-up to the Sunningdale Agreement. Thus Whitelaw wrote 
a robust response to his officials: 
 ‘These documents are damaging in the extreme to John Hackett and 
dangerous. O’Connell will probably let him down as he did me [the 
previous summer]. If any of this became public Hackett would be 
hounded as almost a traitor, certainly as helping the Queen’s enemies! ! 
Not a good position for a General!’62 
 
Whitelaw demanded Hackett receive a strongly worded rebuff to warn the General 
off contacts like this for the sake of his future reputation but Whitelaw’s officials went 
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beyond the whole truth however when they told Hackett that ‘there is no question of using 
you, or for that matter anybody else, as an intermediary.’63 In fact, whether it was through 
Conciliation Ireland, the NILP or even John Hume, the Secretary of State had at this point at 
least three other channels through which communication could occur.  
While good political intelligence regarding the Provisional IRA’s thinking was coming 
to the NIO from these numerous intermediaries, archive evidence suggests that between 
the 1972 ceasefire and the summer of 1974, William Whitelaw was mostly unwilling to open 
two-way communications with the IRA. This was mostly because Whitelaw  felt personally 
betrayed by the publicity the IRA gave to their supposedly secret Cheyne Walk talks and was 
particularly angered by the sudden return to violence and Bloody Friday’s car bomb attacks 
on Belfast. But the above contacts also suggest that Dáithí Ó Conaill remained firmly in 
control of a large and powerful wing of the Provisionals that continued to seek a negotiated 
way out of the conflict.  
 
Back lanes: The use of Laneside for talks with paramilitaries.  
With a change of government and the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement in 
1974, attitudes toward talks with paramilitaries changed again. The change in government 
however did not initially lead to a change in the day to day work of the NIO’s Laneside 
office. James Allan and Michael Oatley (respectively secondments from the FCO and MI6)64 
continued their low-level discussions but talks were in fact undertaken with loyalist groups 
rather than republicans when Labour returned to office and held under very different 
auspices than those with the IRA prior to the 1972 ceasefire. 
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In these meetings Allan and Oatley went to great lengths in their attempts to 
conciliate with groups of loyalist paramilitaries linked with the Ulster Workers Council. This 
included senior members of both the UDA and the UVF and took place both before and 
after the UWC Strike and the atrocities of the bombs in Dublin and Monaghan. They offered 
advice to the loyalist delegates who opened up to them about their concerns relating to 
prisoners and community politics in a series of meetings between May and September 
1974.65   
From the NIO’s perspective, the channelling off of loyalist paramilitaries from the 
rest of the UWC was partly designed as an attempt to bring these groups into the 
mainstream of Northern Ireland politics. James Allan recalls being told to ‘have a chat up the 
chimney, so to speak’ and that the talks were unstructured ‘in many ways the agenda didn’t 
come from [the Northern Ireland Office]. It came from those who were pressing to be seen 
at Stormont or at Laneside… as far as trying to recall it, we weren’t working to a particular 
agenda, it was much more easy going, we were massaging’ Dean Pruitt, has more recently 
suggested that, in order to end their paramilitary campaigns, terrorists need to be made to 
believe that; ‘they can achieve power by coming in from the cold, that they will be more 
effective through participation in legitimate politics than by fighting the authorities.’66 Thus, 
Laneside provided a location where they could express their identities and aspirations freely 
and where misunderstandings in the communities might be resolved with a phone call. For 
the officials at Laneside this was easy to do and added to the guests’ sense of responsibility. 
However, mainstreaming ran an obvious risk of splitting groups into different factions, 
suspicious of what was being said behind closed doors and the disastrous performance of 
Gibson’s newly formed ‘Volunteer Political Party’ in that Autumn’s election (a development 
Laneside had encouraged) demonstrated the lack of support for a political programme from 
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both inside the UVF as well as inside the communities they claimed to be defending. By the 
autumn of 1974 it was clear that unless the IRA also went on ceasefire, any democratic spin-
off from either the UVF or the UDA would not carry the critical mass of internal support 
required to isolate those that continued to use violence. 
The archival record, although far from complete, shows that talks with the IRA began 
again with a 9 July meeting with the Provisionals’ Seamus Loughran67 at Laneside whilst 
these loyalists talks were ongoing. At this meeting Loughran admitted this was the first 
direct contact between the NIO and the Provisionals since the Lenadoon Affair that had 
ended the 1972 ceasefire. Meeting James Allan was a pleasant experience for Loughran, 
who had previously dealt with the NIO’s Dennis Trevelyan and Neil Cairncross (both of 
Home Office extraction) in 1972. Arguably, the diplomatic niceties of MI6 and the FCO 
meant that Allan and Oatley were better suited than the senior Home Office officials that 
populated the rest of the NIO. Loughran said that these men had ‘looked down on me as if I 
was something that had crawled out of a bog.’ Instead, Loughran was given a drink and sat 
down with James Allan to watch the Six O’clock news.68   
The meeting with Loughran was organised through the mediation of Joe Camplisson, 
a community worker, and Dr John Burton, an Australian international conflict specialist then 
at the University of London who wrote about mediation and Northern Ireland in his previous 
works.69 These men were also privately arranging meetings between the UVF and the NIO 
and later the UDA and the IRA.70 While the meeting with Seamus Loughran ran fairly 
smoothly, records of a return meeting have yet to be uncovered, although, as Loughran’s 
continued role is referred to in correspondence between Harold Wilson and Merlyn Rees in 
November 1974, it did take place.71  
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Unfortunately, excluding rather vague correspondence between Wilson and Rees on 
Oatley’s other two conduits, the second half of 1974 remains shrouded in official secrecy by 
MI6. There is little physical evidence available regarding Laneside talks with Republicans in 
Belfast or elsewhere for the rest of that autumn, even though these were continuing to take 
place on an almost daily basis. Brendan Duddy, for example, is adamant that he virtually 
‘lived at Laneside’ at this point72 although this secrecy may be explained by the fact that this 
period was marked by the most intense IRA bombing campaign in England that included the 
multiple pub bombings in Guildford and Birmingham as well as the almost daily attacks 
around the rest of the country. Though he did not elaborate at the time, Peter Taylor 
probably remains correct in his assertion that ‘By late 1973 several of the Provisional leaders 
and most notably David O'Connell were looking for a way to end the campaign... Around this 
time messages from Laneside, apparently originating from Oatley, started to arrive in Dublin 
where the Provisional leadership was based, via the three different channels.’73 We can now 
at least identify two of these channels in Duddy’s ‘Derry link’ and in Belfast with Loughran, 
and two other key Belfast Provisionals Jimmy Drumm and Billy McKee.74  
Although Rees was only made aware of Loughran’s existence later (and Duddy’s later 
still) the work of the community and religious groups, political parties and other individuals  
that communicated to the British the view that the IRA were seeking another peace 
initiative means one can only conclude that the Feakle ceasefire offer did not come ‘out of 
the blue.’ 
Laneside was established precisely for the purpose of channelling information like 
this to the Prime Minister and Secretary of State. It was designed for maintaining links and 
backchannels with groups it would not otherwise have spoken to. In the centre of this 
system was Brendan Duddy, who was rapidly emerging as Oatley’s primary means of secure 
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communication with the PIRA. Functionally however, Duddy remained one of a significant 
number of other private ways the British had of discreet communicating with the IRA (or 
less discreet in the case of John O’Connell or the Feakle clergy who both quickly publicised 
their contacts) and at the centre of the vast majority of these contacts there remained the 
ubiquitous Dáithí Ó Conaill.    
 
Conclusion 
Channels of communication between the IRA and the British Government in the early 
Troubles were numerous and extended far beyond either the Feakle clergy or Brendan 
Duddy’s ‘Link’. They were not dependent on whoever had the upper hand (or felt they had) 
militarily.  In fact, to take a maximalist approach, violence was as much as part of 
communication as the talks themselves were part of the conflict. The gun battles, the 
bombs, the arrests and the security patrols were in many ways simply another means by 
which the Republican movement and the British communicated.75 In a sense this language is 
demonstrated by James Allan and Seamus Loughran’s pause to watch the Six O’clock news 
during their relatively momentous meeting in July 1974. From the point of view of those 
who negotiated the IRA’s 1975 ceasefire, the justification for talks was relatively simple. For 
those at Laneside the Provisional IRA were not fighting a war that had any of the usual 
strategic or territorial aims; rather, it was a guerrilla/terrorist campaign with a specific 
political ambition (i.e. the withdrawal of British sovereignty from Northern Ireland). In this 
sense, whether communication between the IRA and the British manifested itself in bomb 
attacks or in peace talks, the object remained the same. Thus, if the method of 
communication could be changed (and the method itself made a British withdrawal no more 
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likely) then peace, being the absence of political violence, could feasibly be established. 
Secret talks, however they were formulated, were an essential part of this strategy as it was 
hoped that they would give political focus to groups that were otherwise seeking their goals 
through the use of paramilitary violence and terrorism.  
 This was a subtle view and not held by everyone involved in Britain’s governance of 
Northern Ireland. Indeed, communication was refused – or quickly failed – when offered by 
the IRA to representatives of the Home Office, Military Intelligence and MI5. The fact that 
Duddy, Seamus Loughran, along with members of the UDA and UVF were handled primarily 
by NIO ‘Advisors’ seconded from MI6 and the FCO should not be surprising, especially when 
considering Michael Smith’s account of the use of ‘parallel diplomacy’ by MI6.  Much of this 
is down to the culture of MI6 as Britain’s foreign intelligence agency; operating in a deniable 
manner usually outside the state’s borders and thus familiar with operating beyond public 
accountability in ways that were alien to the rest of Britain’s home departments. Laneside 
also existed separately from Britain’s growing security apparatus in Northern Ireland, and 
this made MI6 secondments to the office far more willing to talk.    
 Certainly, Britain’s political leaders were also important in this respect as while 
Whitelaw was willing to trust the IRA with direct contact once, Harold Wilson and Merlyn 
Rees rarely ruled out direct contact in exchange for even the most temporary of ceasefires. 
And while the Irish government steadfastly opposed talks with the Provisionals and urged 
the British to exclusively support the constitutionalist efforts of the SDLP,76 both the SDLP 
and the Irish government had their own secret means of contact with the IRA, (albeit  less 
frequently.77  
 Despite their willingness to communicate, contacts with Northern Ireland’s 
paramilitaries whether direct or via the numerous intermediaries rarely, if ever, constituted 
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negotiations; indeed, conversations were abrupt whenever they strayed into this territory.  
MI6 were never in fact negotiating fundamental points and neither Steele nor Oatley were 
ever given the authority to agree to any constitutional change to the status of Northern 
Ireland, indeed it would have made the talks a farce if they had claimed this kind of power. 
Instead, Laneside was attempting to ‘mainstream’ these organisations, by slowly replacing 
their violent tactics with peaceful ones all the while  avoiding the negotiation of 
constitutional ends.  
Brendan Duddy later described how the IRA had a dichotomous approach to their 
struggle, explaining that ‘this is the department that bombs, and this is the department that 
talks’78 a similar approach was being used by the British in some respects. When the IRA 
approached the wrong people, talks were short and things were boiled down to first 
principles very quickly. While this does not suggest that Dáithí Ó Conaill (or equally Frank 
Steele and Michael Oatley) were malleable individuals (and certainly the papers show the 
opposite is true) the sheer number of direct and indirect contacts Ó Conaill in particular was 
at the heart of, along with his antagonistic relationship with Sean MacStíofáin on the Army 
Council,79 leads to the conclusion that the British did not fully grasp Ó Conaill’s personal 
ambition to deliver an IRA truce and begin a political process until after Labour’s return to 
power in 1974.  
Once the practical concerns of both the IRA and the British were made clear – at 
Feakle, through Loughran and through Duddy – a pro-truce cohort in both camps arranged a 
ceasefire that was followed by more prolonged discussions. This prolonged period of 
discussion, I argue, was the 1975 truce and while this was directly facilitated by Brendan 
Duddy, his role must be seen as part of a larger narrative, existing over several years and 
through a wide variety of different intermediaries. From this point of view, the 1975 truce 
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marked the culmination of systematic attempts by elements within both the British 
government and the Provisional IRA to speak clearly to each other.   
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